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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovation ~is vital to the long-term economic 
growth and stability of any society. By creating jobs, spawning in- 
vestment opportunities and enhancing productivity, technologi- 
cal innovation raises the standard of living for society as a whole. 2 
While some countries have developed formal industrial policies 
to influence directly the nature and direction of technological 
development, the United States, with its market economy, has 
traditionally relied on intervention policies that only indirectly 
influence technological innovation. 3 With mounting national con- 
cern over declining productivity growth and increasing foreign 
competition, United States government intervention has become 
more intense over the past 15 years. 4
At the same time, serious concern about he adverse ffects of 
technological progress on the general environment and on human 
hea]th has emerged. This social concern has resulted in a plethora 
of government regulations through legislation relating to air and 
* Pew Fellow, Health Policy Institute, Boston University. B.A. 1970, Regis College; 
M.P.A. 1979, University of Arizona; Ph.D. expected 1989, Boston University. 
** Associate Professor of Technology and Policy, Center for Technology, Policy and In- 
dustrial Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.A. 1959, Washington Univer- 
sity; Ph.D. 1965, University of Chicago (physical chemistry); J.D. 1972, University of Chicago. 
1. Technological innovation isthe first commercially successful application ofa new tech- 
nical idea. Previous tudies of innovation have used various definitions, ranging from inven- 
tion on the one hand to widespread adoption of technology on the other. Definitions used herein 
draw on a history of several years' work at MIT, beginning with a five-country study, CENTER 
FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SUP- 
PORT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE 
(1975). ~ 
2. See, e.g., Landau, Technola:~y, Economics, and Publ& Policy, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY (R. Landau & D. Jorgenson ed. 1986}. 
3: For a critique of past laissez faire approaches and suggestions for a more interventionist 
role for government, see TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY (C. Hill 
& J. Utterback ed. 1979). 
4. See Rothwell, Government Innovation Policy: Some Past Problems and Recent Trends, 
22 TECH FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1982); Abernathy & Chakravarthy, Govern- 
ment Intervention and Innovation in Industry: A Policy Framework, 20 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 3 
(Spring 1979); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-R-73, A CONTRACTOR'S 
REPORT: GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE INNOVATION PROCESS {1978). 
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water quality, s toxic substances, 6 workplace health and safety, 7
hazardous wastes, s pesticides, 9 and consumer product safety. ~° 
Regulation has always been one of several policy tools used in 
the United States to influence industrial development and 
economic growth. Traditionally, regulation has been used to cor- 
rect market imperfec 9ns that might affect the free functioning 
of the market, e.g. regulation of monopolies. ~1 Broadly con- 
sidered, environmental, health and safety regulation is a relative- 
ly new form of government intervention which is more social than 
economic in its purpose. Yet this latter type of regulation can have 
a significant effect on the operation of United States industry. TM 
This Article reviews the historical impact of environmental, 
health and safety regulation on innovation and considers the 
relevance of this history for the regulation of formaldehyde. 13 
Using an existing conceptual framework, technological responses 
are predicted to environmental regulation that (1) bans the 
chemical through an EPA authority, (2) reduces use of the chemi- 
cal through an EPA authority or (3) limits worker exposure to the 
chemical by means of OSHA regulation. This analysis focuses on 
the use of formaldehyde by the textile and apparel industries. 
Direct economic osts, other systemic changes important for in- 
dustry and labor, and health consequences that would result from 
the most likely responses are discussed. The analysis is based on 
a model of innovation that has been applied to regulation-induced 
5. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §9 7401-7642 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 99 1251-1376 (1982). 
6. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 99 2601-2629 (1982). 
7. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 99 651-678 (1962). 
8. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 9§ 6901-6987 (1982). 
9. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 9§ 136-136y 
(1982). 
10. Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. 9§ 2051-2083 (1982). 
1 I. See W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES (1976}. 
12. See Hoerger, Beamer & Manson, The Cumulative Impact of Health, Environmental, 
and Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industry During the Seventies, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 59-107 (Summer 1983). Observations of the authors suggest that perhaps 10 - 20% of 
chemical industry research and development [hereinafter R&D] is motivated primarily by 
health, environmental and safety concerns, diverting scientific and technical manpower from 
traditional chemical R&D with attendant negative impacts on innovation. The article argues 
that regulatory concepts of the past, such as generic regulations and technology-forcing stand- 
ards, should be discarded in favor of less public involvement in decision making, greater con- 
trol of regulatory decisions by scientists and greater pro-regulation a alysis. 
13. Formaldehyde presents an ideal substance for study. It was a substance intensely 
scrutinized for possible regulation during the Carter Administration, but the first Reagan Ad- 
ministration abandoned the regulatory effort. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, Law and Science 
Policy in Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde, 222 SCI. 894 (1983}. Formaldehyde was only 
recently regulated under the OSH Act. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. This 
Article comments on the limitations of this half-hearted action by the federal government and 
argues that more stringent regulation is preferable. See infra notes 170-85 and accompany- 
ing text. :: 
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technological change and on an analysis of the likely market be- 
havior of the various actors involved in formaldehyde production 
and use. This Article concludes that effective environmental 
regulation depends, in large measure, on technological innovation 
and that OSHA's current regulations limiting worker exposure to 
formaldehyde are least effective in stimulating innovation and 
consequently are inadequate for protecting worker health. 
II. THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION 
Innovation has been variously defined as, and is often confused 
with, the related concepts of invention and diffusion. Properly 
defined, innovation is the first commercially successful applica- 
tion of a new product or technology in the marketplace. 14 Thus, 
innovation is more than either a technical discovery (invention) 
or a vd.'despread option of the commercially successful product 
(diffusion). Rather, it is the result of a process that involves and 
is influenced by a variety of factors. TM
An innovation can be characterized byits type, its significance 
or by the activity from which it evolves. TM Innovation can be 
process-oriented or product-oriented. It can be modest and in- 
cremental or radical and revolutionary in nature. Innovation can 
be the result of an industry's main business activities or can 
evolve from its efforts to comply with health, safety or environ- 
mental demands. Regulation can affect any of these characteris- 
tics. 
A variety of theoretical models attempt to explain the process 
of innovation. The simplest model is sequential nd linear in na- 
ture and describes the innovation process in discrete steps: basic 
research, applied research, invention, prototype development, 
commercialization and diffusion.17 While this model identifies ac- 
tivities that can contribute to innovation, the model erroneously 
suggests hat each step is necessary and follows sequentially from 
the preceding step. However, innovation can and often does occur 
in the absence of one or more discrete steps. For instance, innova- 
tion may occur without basic research, research and development, 
or prototype development bythe innovator.IS As one commentator 
14. See, e.g., Ashford & Heaton, Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemi- 
cal Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (Summer 1983). 
15. See generally TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY, supra 
note 3. 
16. Kurz, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation. Theoretical Foundations: Draft Dis- 
cussion Paper Institute for Applied Economic Research, Ttibingen, West Germany at 6 (1987). 
(To be published inR. KURZ, REGULATION, DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND INNOVATION (1989)). 
17. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14, at 111. 
lS. Id. at 127-36. The observation that innovation often occurs without R&D has impor- 
tant implications for the argument that, even though regulation may divert resources from 
main business R&D, innovation isnot ne cessarily adversely affected. 
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noted, innovation is an "inherently untidy" process.~9 
The inadequacy of the linear or sequential models spurred the 
development of more complex models. The chain-linked model 
emphasizes the key roles of trial and error and feedback. 2° The 
network model focuses on the interdependency among industries 
for innovation. 21 
The Abernathy-Utterback dynamic market-phase model 22 ("A- 
U model") focuses on the differences in the nature of innovation 
across various industries over time. The model, encapsulated in 
the following diagram (see Figure 1), refers to a narrow product 
line or specific process as the unit of analysis. This unit is 
described as a "productive segment. '''~3 The A-U model suggests 
that initially the productive segment creates a market niche by 
selling a new product. Because the technology is new and often 
superior to existing technology, it requires refinement. Thus a 
high degree of product innovation occurs as technology improves 
and more firms enter the market. In this fluid phase, the firm 
does not attempt to make process changes. Improvements in 
process generally become important later when the product is 
thirly well-defined and firms need to compete more on the basis 
of price than on the basis of product performance. During this 
transition stage, process innovation increases, only to subside 
when the productive segment becomes mature and rigid. In this 
last stage, little product or process innovation typically occurs un- 
19. Sahal, Invention, Innovation, and Economic Evolution, 23 TECH. FORECASTING AND 
SOC. CHANGE 213, 214 (1983}. 
20. Unlike the sequential model which emphasizes the importance ofbasic and applied 
research, the chain link model suggests hat design and redesign (engineering) are the essen- 
tial components of innovation. Positing that most innovation isdone with existing knowledge, 
the model emphasizes the importance of feedback throughout the innovation process. See 
Kurz, supra note 16, at 9-10. 
21. The network model assumes that innovation is not isolated in one industry, but 
depends on innovation i  other industries, especially those downstream and upstream. For 
example, an innovation in one industry may stimulate another industry to produce a sub- 
stitute product; acommercially unsuccessful innovation i  One industry could stimulate com- 
mercial success in another. Id. at 11-13. 
22. Unlike the previous models, the Abernathy-{Jtterback model describes the evolution 
ofboth product and process innovation over time as an industry matures. Firms have different 
propensities to innovate at various times in their evolutionary development. This important 
observation has implications for predicting the effect ofregnlation on technological responses 
of the firm. See, e.g., Abernathy & Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation, TECH. 
REV.(June-July 1978}, at 41. See also Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14; Kurz, supra note 16 
and accompanying text. 
23. The term "productive segment" corresponds to a single product line within a firm. 
Specifically with respect to the textile and apparel industries, the productive segments ofin- 
terest are respectively the production of permanent-press cloth using formaldehyde-based 
resins and their conversion i to clothing with permanent-press characteristics. In the chemi- 
cal industry, the productive segment of interest is the manufacture of formaldehyde-based 
resins for use in the textile and apparel industries. See generally Ashford & Heaton, supra 
note 14, at 112. 
F igure  1 
A Model for the Dynamics of Innovation in Industry 
RATE 
OF MAJOR 
INNOVATION 
PRODUCT 
~ PROCESS 
Stage ~ ~ 
of Development Fluid Transition Rigid 
Predominant Frequent major Major process chan- 
type ofinnova- changes in products ges required by 
tion rising volume 
Incremental for 
product and process, 
with cumulative im- 
provement inproduc- 
tivity and quality 
Competitive em- Functional product Product variation 
phasis on performance 
Cost reduction 
Innovation Information on Opportunities 
stimulated by users' needs and created by expand- 
users' technical ing in~ernal techni- 
inputs cal capability 
Pressure to reduce 
cost and improve 
quality 
Product line Diverse, often in- Includes at least one 
cluding custom product design 
designs stable nough to 
have significant 
production volume 
Mostly undifferen- 
tiated standard 
products 
Production 
processes 
Flexible and ineffi- Becoming more Efficient, capital-inten- 
cient; major chan- rigid, with changes sive, and rigid; cost of 
ges easily occurring in major change is high 
accommodated steps 
Equipment General-purpose, 
requiring highly 
skilled labor 
Some subprocesses 
automated, creating 
"islands of 
automation" 
Special-purpose, most- 
ly automatic with 
labor tasks mainly 
monitoring and con- 
trolling 
Materials Inputs are limited 
to generally-avail- 
able materials 
Specialized 
materials may be 
demanded from 
some suppliers 
Specialized materials 
will be demanded; if 
not available, vertical 
integration will be ex- 
tensive 
Plant Small-scale, lo- General-purpose Large-scale, highly 
cated near user or with specialized sec- specific to particular 
source of technology tions products 
Source: Abernathy & Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation, TECH REV., June-July 
1978, at 2-9. 
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less 'che status quo of the industrial segment is somehow per- 
turbed. Environmental regulation is one form of perturbation. 
This Article utilizes the A-U model to analyze the impact of 
formaldehyde r gulation on innovation in the textile and apparel 
industries. This follows earlier work by one of the authors analyz- 
ing technological change in the chemical industry induced by 
regulation. 24 
III. THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION 
A. The Nature of Regulation 
Regulation is an often complex stimulus that restricts or 
redirects the activities of the regulated entity. A lengthy process, 
it begins with the perception or recognition of a need for change 
and can be broadly categorized as economic 2s (e.g., restrictions on 
market entry and exit, wage and price controls), social -°s (e.g., in- 
come redistribution and social insurance programs) or environ- 
mental 27 (protect ion of publ ic health,  safety and the 
environment). Environmental regulations attempt to control dif- 
ferent aspects of the development and production process, includ- 
ing research and development (R&D), production, marketing and 
consumer use. 2s Environmental regulations change over time and 
are "technology-forcing ''29to different degrees. 3°
Most environmental regulation affects product quality or the 
process of production through the development and promulgation 
of standards. It is important o distinguish performance stand- 
24. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14; Ashford, Ayers & Stone, Using Regulation to Change 
the Market forlnnovation, 9 HARV. EN~rL. L. REV: 419 (1985). 
25. See generaUy S. BREYER, REGULATION A~"~,D ITS REFOILM (1982}. 
26. See generally BRUDA, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION THEORIES AND PROGRESS (1977). 
27. See generally J. BONIRE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC- 
TION (1984). 
28. Consumer use can be influenced both through the regulation of product safety and by 
the imposition of labeling requirements. Most of the environmental protection acts passed be- 
tween 1948 and 1977 relied upon direct regulation through the imposition of standards. See 
S. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL (1986). 
29. ~rechnology-forcing ~ refers to the tendency of a regulation to force industry to develop 
or adopt new technology. Regulations may force development or adoption of new technology 
through the use of different typos of restrictions. The degree of technology-forcing ranges from 
pure "health-based" mandates, uch as that in the ambient air quality standards ofthe CAA, 
to a technology diffusion standard, such as "best available technology" under the CWA. 
However, in the absence of political resolve that the benefits of pollution control outweigh the 
socidl and economic disruption of technology-forcing, the capacity of both types of standards 
to force technological changes will be sharply limited. For a discussion ofthis issue and com- 
parison of statutes, ee La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Envi~..nmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977). 
30. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14, at 153. 
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ards from specification standards, al Performance standards et a 
mandatory level of performance and allow the regulated entity 
considerable flexibility in designing or selecting methods to 
achieve compliance2 2 Specification standards, on the other hand, 
define both the particular level of performance and the particular 
method of compliance to be used in achieving the performance 
level? 3 For example, the specification standard may dictate the 
use of specific engineering controls rather than individual 
respiratory protection to reduce xposure to an airborne toxic sub- 
stance in the workplace. 
B. Federal Environmental Regulation 
Since the mid-1960's, the federal government has established 
several new regulatory agencies intended either wholly or in part 
to maintain the quality of the environment. These include the En- 
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), 34 the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) 35 and the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC)26 By adopting regulations to fulfill 
their respective statutory mandates, each of these agencies places 
different demands on industry. Some of these demands affect all 
industries and others affect only specific industrial sectors. This 
Article considers two of these environmental statutes, the Oc- 
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) and the Toxic Sub- 
stances Control Act (TSCA) and explores the impact they are 
likely to have on innovation or other technological changes as- 
sociated with formaldehyde use in permanent-press textiles. 
The OSH Act was passed in 1970 "to assure so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions. ''3v Administered by OSHA within the Depart- 
31. Ashford, Heaton & Priest, Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation and Tech- 
nological Innovation, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY at 193 (C. 
Hill & J. Utterback eds. 1979). 
32. I t  is often asserted that performance standards spur compliance innovation more than 
specification standards. However, comparisons between the two kinds ofstandards are also 
confounded by the different stringencies of the standards. Id. 
33. I fthe specification standard imposes ubstant, ial costs on the industry, innovation may 
be encouraged in compliance technology. However, this would require that the industry ob- 
tain a waiver from the standard method of compliance. See Ash ford, Ayers & Stone, supra note 
24, at 443-62. 
34. The EPA was created as an executive branch agency by Executive Order in 1970. 
35. OSHA was created in the Department ofLaber by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, :;upra note 7. 
36, An independent commission, the CPSC is authorized to regulate the production or 
sale of consumer products that may contain hazardous substances under the Federal Hazard- 
ous Substances Act, 15 U,S.C. §§ 1261-1276 { 1982l and the Consumer Product Safety Act 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1982). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982}. 
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ment of Labor, the Act gives broad authority to the Secretary to 
promulgate both health and safety standards. In promulgating 
standards that deal with toxic substances, the Secretary is in- 
structed to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to 
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available vidence, 
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure 
to the hazard . . ,  for the period of his working life. ''3a 
The TSCA was enacted in 1976 "to regulate chemical substan- 
ces and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment ~fnd to take action with respect o 
chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards 
. . . .  ,,39 Under this statute, the EPA Administrator is given broad 
authority to prohibit or limit the manufacturing, processing, dis- 
tribution, use and disposal of any chemical substance or mixture 
that, in any way, presents an "unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment. ''4° The Act further provides for the 
promulgation of testing, 4t pre-manufacture notification, 42 and 
reporting requirements. 43 
Technological change per se is not the goal of either the TSCA 
or the OSH Act, but may represent a means by which the pur- 
poses of the Acts are achieved. Prior to the passage of the TSCA, 
neither Congress nor the agency administrators indicated any 
concern for the impact of their regulations on innovation. 44Sig- 
nificantly, the declared policy of the TSCA was, in part, "not to 
impede unduly or create unnecessary barriers to technological in- 
novation . . . .  ,,45 The possibility that regulation could actually 
st imulate innovation seems no'~ to have been considered. 
However, in reality, regulation can have both positive and nega- 
tive impacts on innovation. 
38. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b}(5} (1982). Thus, for toxic substances like the carcinoge n formal- 
dehyde, the statute suggests that  where there is no safe level, OSHA is required to set the 
lowest level feasible. However, as a result of Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (OSHA benzene standard), OSHA may regulate only "significant 
risks. ~ OSHAhas judged this latter requirement tobe satisfied at a permissible xposure limit 
of 1 ppm for formaldehyde. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. However, the ap- 
parel industry, seems to have been able to protect he vast majority of its workers at  an exist- 
..... ing exposure level of well below 0.5 ppm. This suggests that,  for the apparel industry at least, 
OSHA did not set the lowest feasible level, and there appear to be significant health effects 
remaining.  See infra notes 178-80 and note 186 and accompanying text. 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2601{b1(2)(19821. 
40. Id. § 2605(al. 
41. Id. §2603. 
42. Id. § 2604. 
43. ld. § 2607. 
44. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, andAdministrativeLaw:AConceptualFramework, 
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1981). 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982~. 
Spring, 1988] Regulation of Formaldehyde 71 
C. The Impact of Regulation on Innovation 
An industry's perception of the need to change ither a product 
or a process may precede any regulatory action. Public concern, 
an increase in tort suits (especially when liability is imposed), ad- 
verse publicity or comment in the press, and pressure from en- 
vironmental or labor groups may all provide stimuli for change. 
Indeed, these factors may simultaneously stimulate both the in- 
dustry and the regulatory agency. This pre-regulatory period is 
important because it alerts the industry to the need for change 
and allows time for the industry to change its product or process 
or to develop compliance technologies. 46 Analyses of the impact of 
regulation on technological innovation seldom consider this com- 
plex pre-regulatory baseline. Yet it is important to recognize and 
differentiate these stimuli because industry often begins t,: 
respond technologically in anticipatio,, of regulation, sometimes 
long before publication of the regulation in the Federal Register. 
OSHA regulation of formaldehyde follows this pattern. 
The literature on the impact ofregulatior.~ oninnovation is con- 
tradictory, sometimes ideological and certainly far from com- 
plete. 47 Most authors conclude that environmental and safety 
regulation has had an adverse impact on innovation, except for 
compliance technology development. 4a Those reaching this con- 
clusion typically argue along the following lines: 
1. Compliance with environmental, health and safety 
regulation is costly. It reduces not only the profitability 
of an industry, but also the ability of the firm to under- 
take innovative ndeavors and to expand its research 
and development. The estimated private sector com- 
pliance cost of all such regulation in 1979 was $98 bil- 
lion. ~9 
2. Regulation increases the uncertainty of would-be-in- 
novators. Such uncertainty derives from vague or chang- 
ing regulations, conflicting or inconsistent regulations 
and the uncertain commercial success of a regulated 
product? ° 
46. See ,~shford & Heaton, supra note 14, at  120. 
47. Compare, Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14 and Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 
31 with Kurz, supra note 16 and Rothwell, Some Indirect Impacts of Government Regulation 
on Industrial Innovation in the United States, 19 TECH. FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 57 
{198D. 
48. See generaIly FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL L~;NOVATION ~C. HiII ed. 1979~. 
49. See Rothwell, supra note 47: This assertion rests on two crucial assumptions: ~ 1) R&D 
is an important ingredient for innovation and (2~ compliance costs divert efforts from R&D. 
But cf. Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at 177-78. 
50. Rothwell, supra note 47, at  62. This follows from the increased risk of commercial 
failure i f future regulations impose demands on product characteristics. 
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3. Regulation delays the introduction of new products into 
the market. ~ 
4. ReguJation diverts resources from main bu.~::ness innova- 
tion activities into compliance-related activities. '~2 
5. Regulation handicaps small firms. '~a Yet, data suggest 
that smaller organizations introduce a disproportionate 
share of commercially-oriented innovations into the 
• marketplace ~4 and keep the competitive spirit alive. 
In addition to these direct effects, regulation may reduce in- 
centives to innovate. For instance, industry has little incentive to 
develop innovations that go beyond the performance level indi- 
cated in the regulation. ~'~ Moreover, because the regulated in- 
dustries participate in the regulatory process, they may cause tht', 
standard to be set at levels achievable with existing on-the-shelf 
technology.. '~6 Rather than stimulating innovation, this will result 
:.a~.:most iP. technological diffusion. If the applicable standards are 
Of the specification type, innovation may be further discouraged 
because specifying the method of compliance severely restricts 
the possibility that the regulated entity will respond by develop- 
mg new technology. '~7 In this regard, however, the distinction be- 
tween specification and performance standards may not be clear 
cut. Indeed, if a performance standard simply mandates a per- 
51. Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at 172-75. 
52. Ends, Chemical.s as a Regulated Industry: Implications for Research a~ll Prc.'tuct 
Development, in FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION at 1-20 (C. Hill cd 
1979). See also Rothwen, supra note 47, at  74. Both financial and managerial ttention may 
be diverted to comply v.ith regulation. 
53 .  Diamond, The Different'~l Impact of Government Regulalioa on Small Vers(L~ Large 
Business: A Review of an Inadequate Information Base, 5 JOINT ECONOM: "~. COMMr,'I'EE OF 
THE U.S. CONGRESS: SPECIAL STUDY ON ECONOMIC CHANGE 270 (1980). 
54. Re,archers have documen~d the desire for independence, the creative drive and the 
need for recognized achievement i  small firms. In fact, small firms produce about wice as 
many significant in,ovations per employee as large firms produce. ISSUEALERT: INNOVATION ": 
IN SMALL FIRMS,OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMAI,L BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (1986); 
RoberL% Ent~epreneurship and Tec[~nology, RESEARCH ~M_ANAGEMENT (1978). 
55. See Xurz, supra no~ 16, at 43. 
56. Th, re is a strong correlation between the type of regulation and the nature of the 
regulatory tl,sponse, .g, product regulation generally leads to product response, while pol- 
lutant and component regulation generally '.-ad to process respons e. For the hazardous 
materials surveyed, ~,he actual standard resulting from the regulatory i~t~i ~S sappears in most 
cases to be ba.~d largely on considerations of technological feasibility: T~,e agencies consis- 
tently use substantial industry input in drafting the regulations, resulting in standards that 
can be easily satisfied with on-the.shelf technol?gy. For example, the final rule on lea,4-in- 
paint was modified substantially onthe ba~!s of the bearingcomments. SeeAshford & Heaton, 
The Effects of ttvalth and Envirc, nmental Regulation on Technological Change in the Chemi- 
cal Industry: Theory and Evidence, in FEI)EIL-~.L.REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATIt~N 
(C. Hill ed., 1979). 
57. But cf. Ashford, Ayers & Stone, supra note 33. 
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missible level of exposure that can be met by existing technology, 
it becomes little more than a specification standard. Finally, 
regulations requiring the submission of confidential, proprietary 
information to the regulatory agency may discourage innovation 
because such disclosure may provide outsider access to commer- 
cially important information, s8 
That regulation generally has an adverse impact on innova- 
tion is not, however, a universally accepted i ea. Another group 
of authors has extolled the positive effects that environmental, 
health and safety regulation can have on innovation. These 
views 59 may be summarized as follows: 
1. Regulation can reduce commercial risk through inten- 
sified premarket testing requirements. 6° 
2. Redirection of research and development may actually 
increase innovation. A study of the impact of regulation 
on innovation in five foreign countries found that main 
business innovations were more likely to be commercial- 
ly successful when environmental regulations were 
present as an element of the planning process than when 
the regulations were absent. 6~ 
3. Regulation can create the need for new compliance tech- 
nology. 62 
4. Compliance-related chnological change has often led to 
product improvements far beyond the scope of the com- 
pliance 63 
5. Regulation creates opportlmities for technological 
58. If the information is not protected by patent, trade secrets could be divulged. The 
reduction in trade secret protection isseen as penalizing technological innovation because it
decreases the legal protection (and hence the rewards) available to new technologies. Whether 
such fears are real or imagined, they may produce achilling effect on innovation. 
59. See Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at 167-90. 
60. Because standards both provide a definite statement of legal requirements and en- 
courage the development of safer products, they may limit highly unpredictable products 
liability suits, ld. at 175. 
61. Allen, U'~erback, Sirbu, Ashford & Holloman, Government Influence on the Process of 
Innovation in Europe and Japan, 7 RES. POL. 124 (]978).The study found that, in general, 
the proportion of successful and unsuccessful projects was statistically the same regardless 
of whether or not the government was involved. However, where there were regulatory con- 
straints of various kinds (primarily in the form of environmental and product safety require- 
ments in industrial chemical ar, d auto industries), the project was more often successful. Id. 
at 148. 
62. The need to create new compliance t chnologies, and the dynamic relationships be- 
tween the regulated and pollution control industries, have restructured the innovative effort 
in many industries..~n fact, between 1974 and 1983, the expenditures in the pollution control 
industry will total about $44 billion. Leung & Klein, The Environmental Control Industry 104 
(submitted toCOUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY) (1975). 
63. Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at 186. 
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. 
. 
change. One study reported that 33% of the firms sur- 
veyed indicated they had made process improvements in 
response to regulation. ~ Another study found that 
process improvements were made even in unregulated 
areas when regulation occurs. 6s 
If regulation spurs the affected industry to add technical 
experts in order to achieve compliance, the creativity pool 
of that industry will increase, with concomitant increase 
in the likelihood of innovation generally. 66
Regulation can create market opportunities for new 
entrants who offer safer products, v
These authors acknowledge the costs that regulation impose 
on industry, but suggest that regulatory costs are often passed on 
to the consumer, especially in the areas of pharmaceuticals, e -
sential chemicals and products with no close substitutes: 6s In ad- 
dition, a large part of the uncertainty surrounding regulation can 
be attributed to an industry's own efforts to modify or litigate 
proposed standards29 Moreover, it is argued that some uncertain- 
ty is healthy because absolute certainty about regulation provides 
little incentive to surpass mandated performance l vels, v° 
Both groups of authors cite empirical evidence to support their 
conclusions. However, the number of studies is relatively small 
and those that exist have some methodological difficulties. These 
difficulties include measuring both the degree of innovation and 
the intensity of regulation, 71establishing that regulation causes 
rather than simply correlates with observed falls in business in- 
novation duri:lg periods of ..-egulation, TM and defining the ap- 
propriate time Jag between the regulatory stimulus and the 
technologic response. 
64. J. INVEY¢.STINE, J. KINARD & W. SLAUGHTER, IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC- 
TION REGULAT.~ONS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL IN- 
DUSTRY, (1976). 
65. Ashford, Heaten & Priest, supra note 31, at  180. 
66. The addiGon of sophisticated analytical chemistry expertise in order to assess the 
health and environmental risks of both new and existing products may lead to better under- 
standing of the nature and possible applications of the product. Id. at 181. 
67. Id. at 174. There has been an average decline from 15% to 6.3% in the rate o f return 
for new drugs. SCHWARTZ,~, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1976). 
However, the extent o which this decline is related to health and safety regulation is unclear. 
The decline probably results in large part  from the regulatory requirement for proofofefficacy. 
Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at  174. 
68. Ashford, Hen!on & Priest, supra note 31, at  174. 
69. Id. 
70. Regulatory uncertainty is often necessary and beneficial, as it allows some degree of 
administrative flexibility. Id. at 164. 
71. See Kurz, ,supra note 16, at 14-17, 21. 
72. See Ashford, Heaton & Priest, supra note 31, at 171. 
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On balance, there is evidence and agreement that environmen- 
tal regulation can both impede and stimulate innovation. The im- 
pact of a regulation on innovation is a function of the type and 
stringency of the regulation, as well as of the developmental stage 
of the productive segment33 (See Figure 1. ) Thus, both the govern- 
ment and the regulated industry can affect he impact of regula- 
tion on innovation. The government could design environmental 
regulations to increase the probability of an innovative tech- 
nological response. Industry could respond to environmental 
regulations in innovative ways. The following section presents ex- 
amples of how selected industrial sectors have responded to 
recent environmental regulations. 74These examples are relevant 
for predicting technological response in the case of formaldehyde. 
D. Examples of the Impact of Regulation on Innovation 
1. PCB's 
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) are compounds widely used 
to provide coolant insulation in electrical transformers and 
capacitors35 PCB's are biologically stable substances that persist 
in the environment and in human tissue and are known to cause 
a variety of adverse health effects. T° In 1979, the EPA, under the 
TSCA, banned both commercial distribution and manufacture of 
PCB's beginning January 1, 1980. 7~ However, three years prior to 
the EPA manufacturing ban, Monsanto, the sole United States 
supplier of PCB's, announced that it was pulling out of the PCB 
market3 s As early as 1970, Monsanto attempted to manufacture 
73. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 14, at 113 (Figure 1). 
74. See generally Ashford, Ayers & Stone, supra note 24. 
75. See TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS at 647 (J. Doull, C. Klassen & M. 
Amdur 2 ed. 1980). 
76. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL ALq) OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE at 596 (W. Rein ed. 
1983 }. The most notable adverse health effect of PCB exposure surfaced in Japan in 1968. The 
ingestion of PCB-contaminated rice oil caused an epidemic of a severe form of acne called 
ehloracne. Affected individuals also had anemia, as well as gastrointestinal and neurological 
problems. In addition, there was evidence of low-birthweight babies and retarded growth in 
children in the exposed population. The PCB's used in the United States differ in isomer dis- 
tribution and the presence ofcontaminants. The largest survey of United StaOes PCB workers 
revealed evidence of skin changes (40%}, impaired pulmonary function {14%), and limited 
evidence of liver abnormalities. Animal studies have demonstrated that the incidence of liver 
neoplasms increases and that PCB's are secreted in human breast milk. Id. at 597. 
77. TSCA §§ 6(eX2XA), (eX3XA}, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(A), (eX3)(A). Section 6(eX3}(A) 
generally prohibits the manufacture of PCB's beginning January 1, 1979, and the processing 
and commercial distribution ofPCB's beginning July 1, 1979. Sec.tion 6(eX2XA) prohibits the 
use ofPCB's, other than within totally enclosed areas, beginning January 1,1978. EPA regula- 
tions implementing section 6 appear at 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1984). 
78. Ashford, Hattis, Heaton, Jaffe, Owen & Priest,Environmental /Safety Regulation and 
"Technological Change in the U.S. Chemical Industry, CPA NO. 79-6 (Mar. 1979) (Report o the 
National Science Foundation} [hereinafter CPA Chemical Industry Study]. Results of this 
study were published inFEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION, supra note 48. 
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a more biodegradable form and restricted the sale of PCB's to 
manufacturers of closed electrical systems. 79 This action 
prompted an innovation in capacitor design which reduced PCB 
use by sixty-six percent, s° 
The PCB industry first became aware of the possibility of en- 
vironmental regulation sl of PCB's in the late 1960's when the 
federal government began regulatory surveillance of the sub- 
stance, s2 With Monsanto's withdrawal from the market, PCB 
users were forced to look for substitute products. Five substitutes 
were subsequently developed by new entrants to the PCB 
manufacturing market, s3 These new entrants were the original 
downstream users of PCB's. s4 This case thus illustrates the im- 
portance of the pre-regnlatory period and the usefulness of the 
A-U model of innovation. When faced with the possibility of en- 
vironmental regulation, the sole supplier of a product in a rigid 
preductive segment attempted some modest process innovation 
and ultimately withdrew from the PCB market. The new entrants 
responded to the EPA ban with radical product innovation, 
developing PCB substitutes for transformers and capacitors. 
2. Vinyl Chloride 
A variety of toxic effects have been associated with vinyl 
chloride exposure, ss In 1974, the first cases of angiosarcoma ssof 
79. CPAChemical Industry Study, supra note 78, at A-14. Monsante's actions prior to for- 
mal regulatory action reveal the often complex nature of public pressure and the role of govern- 
ment intervention i stimulating private action. However, it seems appropriate oattribute 
Monsanto's actions to the regulatory process. 
80. ld. at C-18 (citing B. Nerns, Statement Representing Westinghouse Ca~., in Nation- 
al Conference on PCB's) (Nov. 19-21, 1975) (EPA-560/6-75-004}; Telephone interview with 
Robert Sawyer, Manager of Manufacturing Support, Westinghouse Distribution Apparatus 
Division (Apr. 26, 1985). 
81. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration began surveillance of PCB's in human and 
animal food in 1968. See Highland, PCB's in Food, ENV~r. 12 (Mar. 1976). 
82. Ashford, Ayers & Stone, supra note 24, at 432. 
83. Id. at 433. The transformer substitute developed by Monsanto was a type cf silicone 
(polydimethlysiloxane). The four PCB capacitor substitutes were isopropyl naphthalene, buty- 
lated monochlorodiphenyl oxide, di-isononyl phthalate ster, and a mixture of di-octyl phtha- 
late ester with trichlorobenzene. 
84. Id. General Electric (a transformer manufacturer and silicon producer) and Dow Corn- 
mg (a silicon producer) independently developed the transformer substitute. The capacitor 
substitutes were developed by capacitor firms or by chemical firms in conjunction with 
capacitor firms. 
85. See generally Rom, supra note 76, at 579-88. (The earliest references in the literature 
to liver disease or findings suggestive of acroosteolysis (AOL) in vinyl chloride monomer 
workers date from 1949. The liver findings included ~hepatitis-like changes." The AOL, 
described in more detail in the 1960's, typically includes ymptoms ~i"daynaud's phenomenon. 
More recent findings include pulmonary function decrements, chromosomal berrations and 
possible genetic and reproductive ffects.) 
86. Hepaticangiosarcoma~is a rare f.orm of liver cancer. 
Spring, 1988] Regulation of Formaldehyde 77 
the liver among polyvinyl chloride (PVC) workers were reportedY 
OSHA quickly promulgated a vinyl chloride standard reducing 
permissible workplace xposure levels to 1 part per million 
(ppm). ss Two years later, EPA issued vinyl chloride emission 
standards under the Clean Air Act. s9 
Manufacturers of the vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) and PVC 
questioned the technological nd economic feasibility of comply- 
ing with both the OSHA and EPA regulations2 ° Nevertheless, in 
response to these regulations, the PVC industry made a number 
of important, hough incremental, process innovations21 The in- 
dustry automated and closed their reactor cleaning systems and 
developed new technology toreduce the handling of resin22 They 
also used on-the-shelf technology to reduce leaks in their 
manufacturing systems23 The VCM industry, less severely af- 
fected by these regulations than was the PVC industry, complied 
by improving equipment maintenance in order to lower emissions 
and by installing incinerators to destroy unwanted monomer, s4 
The PVC fabricators were affected by the OSHA regulation only 
and responded by upgrading ventilation, automating some 
materials handling tasks and incrementally changing parts of the 
fabrication process to reduce xposure to residual VCM.gS Because 
the innovations undertaken by the PVC polymerization industry 
in response to OSHA and EPA regulation eliminated most of the 
environmental hazard before the product was delivered to the 
fabricators, the necessary compliance fforts of the fabricators 
were much less substantial. 
In sum, although the vinyl chloride industry resisted environ- 
mental regulation, the resultant innovations both improved 
production processes and provided a safer environment for the 
worker28 
3. Cotton Dust 
Byssinosis, also called brown lung, is a progressive and 
87. The auth°rs described three cases °fangi°sarc°ma °fthe liver am°ng P'v'C p°lymeriza- 
tion workers at the B.F. Goodrich plant in Louisville, ICY. Creech &Johnson, Angiosarcoma 
of Liver in the Manufacture of Polyvinyl Chloride, 16 J. OCCUP. MED. 150 (1974). Subsequent 
studies identified additional cases. See Rom, supra note 76, at 579-88. 
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(c) (1984). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982). 
90. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 78, at A-26 to A-28. 
91. ld. at C-2 to C-9. 
92. Id. 
93. ld. at C-9. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at C-3. 
96. Ashford, Hattis, Heaton, Katz, Priest & Zolt, Evaluating Chem ;cal Regulations: Trade- 
off Analysis and Impact Assessment for Environmental Decision.making, NTIS No. PB81- 
195067, at A-113-14. 
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debilitating respiratory disease that has left many cotton textile 
workers totally and permanently disabled. 97 As a result, OSHA 
initiated efforts to reduce workplace exposure to cotton dust in 
1974. 98 However, the mature American textile industry stubborn- 
ly resisted all regulatory efforts and pursued its claims to the 
Supreme Court. In American Textile Manufacturers Institute Inc. 
v. Donovan, the Court upheld the OSHA standard. 99 The final cot- 
ton dust standard, issued in 1984, established ifferent exposure 
limits for various segments of the cotton textile industry, as well 
as for non-textile industries. 1°° 
In order to comply with these standards, the affected industry 
utilized largely existing technology to modernize its equipment 
and manufacturing processes. 1°1 Although little real innovation 
occurred, broad diffusion of state-of-the-art extile technology 
resulted.102 Some observers uggest hat these regulation-induced 
changes have resulted in a net benefit to the cotton textile in- 
dustry.103 Indeed, it is apparent hat the OSHA cotton dust stand- 
ard prompted, or at least accelerated, the modernization of the 
American textile industry. 
97. Byssinosis a serious and important occupational chronic bronchitis that begins with 
chest ightness and can progress to severe pulmonary impairment. See generally Rom, supra 
note 76, at 207-14. 
98. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,769 (1974) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking soliciting com- 
ments). 
99. Without arguing the technological feasibility of the OSHA standard, the textile in- 
dustry contended that OSHA had exceeded its statutory authority by failing to conduct acost- 
benefit analysis and by failing to determine that the standard's benefits justified the costs of 
compliance. By a vote of 5 to 3, the Supreme Court held that cost-benefit analysis was not re- 
quired by the OSH Act. Instead, it found that § 6(bX 5) of the Act required ~feasihility analysis." 
defining =feasible" as "capable of being done, executed, or effected." American Textile Mfrs. 
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981). The Court ruled that § 6(b)5 &the OSH 
Act "directs the Secretary to issue the standard that 'most adequately assures . . ,  that no 
employee will suffer material impairment ofhealth,' limited only by the extent o which this 
is 'capable of being done.' In effect... Congress iL~elf defined the basic relationship between 
costs and bet,tilts, by placing the 'benefit'of worker health above all other considerations save 
those making attainment ofthis 'benefit' unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of 
costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Con- 
gcess would be inconsistent with the command set I',a.~,~h i~a § 6(bX5)." Id.at 509. 
100. Different exposure limits, however, were .,¢,t such that equivalent levels of risk were 
provided across the industry. This reflects the varying nature and composition ofcotton dust 
in different operations. Occupational Safety and Health Standards Subpart Z-%xie and Haz- 
ardous Substances, 29 C.ER. § 1910.1043(e) (1984). 
101. R. RUTTENBERG, COMPLIANCE WITH THE OSH.A COTTON RULE: THE ROLE OF 
PRODUCTIVITY-IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 1983) (submitted under contract to the Of- 
flee of Technology Assessment). 
102. See Ashford, Ayers & Stone, supra note 24, at 442. 
103. See RUTI'ENBERG, supra note 101. See also AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE 
WORKERS UNION, DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF THE OSHA COTTON DUST STANDARD (Mar. 1983) (unpublished report). 
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IV. FORMALDEHYDE 
Formaldehyde (HCHO) is a ubiquitous, toxic chemical that 
deserves to join the ranks of regulated substances. A major in- 
dustrial chemical, formaldehyde ranks 24th in production volume 
in the United StatesJ °4 Approximately 5.7 billion pounds of 37% 
formaldehyde (by weight) was manufactured in 1985.1°'~ Used 
primarily as an intermediary in the manufacture of a variety of 
resins, formaldehyde is also popularly used as a preservative, ger- 
micide and fungicide in a wide variety of consumer products, in- 
c luding cosmetics,  d is in fectants ,  pharmaceut ica l s  and 
agricultural productsJ °~ Approximately 59% of all formaldehyde 
produced is consumed in the manufacture of urea, phenolic or 
melamine resins which are widely used in textile finishing, 
plywood and particle board manufacturing, adhesives and 
sealants, paper treating and coating and insulation materials, lo: 
Toxic effects of formaldehyde result from exposure during 
manufacturing operations involving use of any formaldehyde- 
based product. 
A. The Hazard 
The irritant effects of formaldehyde have been well known for 
many years.l°s Eye, nose and throat irritation occur at concentra- 
tions as low as 0.1 ppm.l°9 At higher concentrations, formaldehyde 
can cause coughing, dyspnea nd pulmonary edema, n° Formal- 
dehyde is also a potent skin irritant and sensitizer. Dermal sen- 
sitization has been caused by many products that contain 
formaldehyde, including textiles, paper, cleaning agents and nail 
hardeners, m Household products containing 1% formaldehyde 
104. Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168, 46,172 
(1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910 and 1926) [heminat~er OSHA Final Rule]. 
i05. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. ld. 
108. This section summarizes the health effect data presented in OSHA's Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking for Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50Fed. Reg. 50,412, 50,414 (1985) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910), reprinted in 15 THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
REP. 605, (1985) [hereinafter OSHA NPR].. 
109. One investigation f eight textile plants in England where formaldehyde was used 
to treat fabrics found complaints ofmucous membrane irritation, tearing and wheezing in ap- 
proximately 15% of the employees. Formaldehyde concentrations ranged from 0 to 2.7 ppm, 
with an average of 0.68 ppm in the plants. See SHIPKOVITZ, as cited in OSHA NPR, supra 
note 108, at 50,425. 
I lO. See OSHA Fina! Rule, supra note 104, at 46,173. 
l 11. Dermal sensitization is a well-known phenomenon. I  patch testing results done of 
atopic individuals seeking medical assistance atallergy clinics, formaldehyde is among the 
top ten sensitizers. Sensitization is not readily reversible, so, once sensitized, an individual 
must usually avoid all c~mtact with formaldehyde. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 
46,173-77, and OSHA NPR, supra note 108, at 50,427-30. 
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are considered strong sensitizers under the Federal Hazardous 
Substances Act, H2 and, as such, must bear a cautionary label. ''3 
However, it is the potential carcinogenic effect of formaldehyde 
that has prompted recent regulatory activity. ,,4 
In 1979, the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT) 
reported the results of a 24-month inhalation animal bioassay."s 
Both neoplastic and non-neoplastic lesions of the nasal cavity 
were found. Researchers at New York University corroborated 
the results of this study two years later. Hs Several earlier 
epidemiologic studies demonstrated increased risk of death from 
brain cancer and leukemia in humans. H7 One prospective study 
of British chemical factory workers revealed a statistically sig- 
ni f icant excess mortal i ty  from lung cancer and chronic 
bronchitis, l's 
In 1980, the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, composed of 
scientists from eight federal agencies, includi f~ OSHA, concluded 
that it was "prudent o regard formaldehyde as posing a car- 
cinogenic risk to humans. "1'9 In 1981, the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and 13 other unions petitioned OSHA e:ither to issue an 
Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) or to initiate permanent 
rulemaking. '2° This action marks the beginning of the regulatory 
furor over formaldehyde. Table 1 summarizes the major events. 
OSHA estimates that approximately 2.1 million workers are ex- 
posed to formaldehyde in a variety of industries and that about 
200,000 workers are exposed to levels above 0.5 ppm. TM Nearly 
half of these workers exposed are in the apparel industry. '22 
B. The Use of Formaldehyde in the Textile and Apparel In- 
dustries 
The textile industry has produced fabrics treated with formal- 
dehyde-based resins for over 50 years. These resins impart hree 
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1983). 
113. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.13. 
114. OSHA NPR, supra note 108, at 50,430-47. 
115. Id. at 50,4i4-1.~, 50,433-34. 
116. Id. at50,434. 
117. Id. at 50,446. These studies involved professional groups who preserv e human tis- 
sues with solutions containing formaldehyde and other chemicals. Such risks have not been 
detected among industrial workers. 
118. Id. at50,441-42. 
119. Id. at50,415. 
120. ld. 
121. OSHA's Final Rule provides estimates ofthe number of affected establishments and 
employees, by SIC Code and industry. OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104 at 46,239; but cf. infra 
notes 177-180 and accompanying text for criticism of this estimate. 
122. OSHA estimates that, ofthe 2.16 million workers exposed to formaldehyde, 941,000 
are in the apparel industry. OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,239. 
History 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1987 
1987 
Table 1. 
of Regulatory Action Regarding Formaldehyde 
CIIT study implicates formaldehyde as an animal 
carcinogen. 
Federal Panel on Formaldehyde concludes that it is 
prudent o regard formaldehyde as a carcinogenic 
risk to humans. 
NYU st,_,dy corroborates CIIT findings. 
UAW petitions OSHA for an Emergency Temporary 
Standard (ETS). OSHA denies request on 1/19/82. 
EPA Office of Toxic Substances determines that for- 
maldehyde might be a candidate for action under 
section 4(f) of the TSCA. EPA ultimately concludes 
that the available scientific information is insuffi- 
cient to trigger section 4(f), and drops it as a priority 
for consideration. 
CPSC bans use of urea-formaldehyde foam insula- 
tion (UFFI) in residences and schools. Overturned 
in 1983 when Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finds 
that CPSC failed to support its ban with substantial 
evidence. 
District court in Washington, DC remands UAW 
petition fbr an ETS to OSHA for reconsideration, or 
for initiation of permanent rulemaking. 
HUD issues regulations covering formaldehyde 
emissions from pressed wood products in manufac- 
tured homes and requires that plywood and particle 
board ~v~it 0.2 ppm and 0.3 ppm respectively. 
OSHA af~ain denies UAW petition for ETS, but in- 
dicates continuing consideration of need for a per- 
manent standard. 
OSHA issues notice of proposed rulemaking in 
which it indicates that it will reduce the permissible 
exposure limit to either 1.5 or 1.0 ppm, 
An EPA study ~.ndicates that formaldehyde is "a 
probable human carcinogen," and the agency indi- 
cates that it will consider egulatory action. 
OSHA promulgates final formaldehyde standard, 
limiting workplace xposure level to 1.0 ppm. 
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important characteristics to textiles: durable-press, hrinkage 
control and wrinkle resistance. 1~3 Early in its development, for- 
maldehyde-based r sins could not be used on cotton textiles be- 
cause of resulting fabric deterioration. Their use on cotton textiles 
became acommercial success in the early 1950's. Since that time, 
consumer demand for cotton and cotton-blend apparel has in- 
creased. 124 Approximately 62% of all apparel manufactured in the 
United States uses cotton or cotton-blend textiles and about 80% 
of these are treated with resins containing formaldehyde.125 Most 
of this fabric is treated by the textile and finishing mills and vir- 
tually all of the apparel manufacturing plants handle such fabrics 
during any given year. 126 The National Cotton Council's consumer 
preference surveys uggested that cotton fiber can clearly capture 
an even larger share of the retail apparel market, but only if the 
textile retains its durable-press characteristics. ~2~ The Council 
noted that there were no commercially available alternatives to
using formaldehyde-based resins for obtaining these characteris- 
tics and that "the net result of any regulation lowering formal- 
dehyde levels in apparel manufacture, of course, would be reduced 
competitiveness of domestically manufactured apparel with a cor- 
responding adverse ffect on an already critical textile and ap- 
parel trade situation. "~2s 
V. REGULATORY OPTIONS AND POSSIBLE 
TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSES 
Worker exposure to formaldehyde can be affected by actions 
under the TSCA, 129 which is administered by the EPA Office of 
Toxic Substances, orby regulations under the OSH Act. 13° 
123. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., Comments on the Environmental 
Protection Agency's Regulatory Investigation of Formaldehyde, Docket Control No. OPTS 
62033, 5 (1984} [hereinafter ATMI]. 
124. Cotton consumption by United States apparel manufacturers and cotton's hare of 
the retail apparel market increased steadily during the 1980's. See Comments of the Nation- 
al Cotton Council of America to OSHA's Request for Information on Occupational Exposure 
to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed. Reg. 1547 {March 1, 1985) [hereinafter NCC]. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 3. 
127. Id. and appendices. 
128. See Comments of the NCC to EPA's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-For- 
maldehyde: Determination f Significant Risk, at 8 July 23, 1984 (in response to49 Fe~]. Reg. 
21,870 (May 23, 19841}. 
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629. 
130. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. 
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A. Regulation Under EPA 
When EPA received the results of the Federal Panel on 
Formaldehyde's deliberations in 1981, TM officials in the Office of 
Toxic Substances determined that the evidence was sufficient to 
require EPA to consider egulating under section 4(f) of the 
TSCA. 132 Ultimately, the agency did not act. 133 Had it opted to 
regulate formaldehyde under the TSCA, at least wo options were 
available. The agency could ban the use of the product, as it did 
with PCB's a decade arlier, or it could reduce the allowable con- 
centration of formaldehyde in resin. Under either EPA action, it 
is likely that significant product innovation would occur. 
1. A Ban 
Consumer surveys conducted by the textile and apparel in- 
dustries clearly indicate a preference for cotton-blend, urable- 
press clothing. TM Mereover, the cotton and cotton-blend textile 
and apparel manufacturers will not voluntari:_y give up their 
share of the market o synthetic fabric manufacturers. A ban 
would create the demand for a substitute product. Textile and ap- 
parel manufacturers, as downstream users of formaldehyde 
resins, would likely turn to the suppliers for help. With sufficient 
notice, their suppliers could respond. 
In the late 1970's, in anticipation offuture regulation and with 
pressure from a major apparel manufacturer, the existing chemi- 
cal suppliers developed resins containing lower concentrations of 
formaldehyde, 135 which are now used but are reported to provide 
131. Report of the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, 43 E~'~trrL HEALTH PERsP. 139 (1982), 
[hereinafter Federal Panel Report]. The panel was composed of top scientists of the federal 
government and was directed to evaluate all available information on the effects of exposure 
to formaldehyde. 
132. Ut, der section 4fof the TSCA, if the EPA Administrator is presented with informa- 
tion =which indicates . . .  that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical 
substance or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm 
to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects, the Administrator sha l l . . ,  in- 
itiate appropriate act ion. . ,  to prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk or publish in 
the Federal Register a finding that such risk is not unreasonable. ~ 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f)(2). 
133. For an interesting historical account, see A~hford, Ryan & Caldart, A Hard Look at 
Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure ~om Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1983). 
134. See NCC Comments on OSHA's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Occapa- 
tional Exposure to Formaldehyde, August 15, 1985 (in response to 50 Fed. Reg. 15,179 (April 
17, 1985D. 
135. Levi Strauss, conscious oflikely future regulation and citing concern for its workers, 
instituted a policy that it would not accept fabric from its suppliers with more than 500 
micrograms of formaldehyde per gram of cloth. Formerly, upwards of 2000 micrograms/gram 
was used. Personal communication with Larry Elliott, Supervisory Industrial Hygienist, 
Hazard Evaluation Technical Assistance, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Cincinnati, OH and Beth Andrews, Textile Chemist, Southern Regional Research Cen- 
ter, Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), New 
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somewhat inferior durable-press cbaracteristics to textiles. 136 
Non-formaldehyde substitutes137 also have been developed by ex- 
isting suppliers, but none have been acceptable for use in treat- 
ing fabric because they are considered more expensive to use and 
considerably less effective. 138 The American Textile Manufac- 
turers Institute (ATMI) has said that "[m]andating nonformal- 
dehyde treatments would be unrealistic, is not necessary and 
would force consumers back to the drudgery of ironing. '''39 
To date, the existing suppliers have not developed a commer- 
cially successful non-formaldehyde substitute, even during a 
protracted, visible and emotionally charged pre-regulatory 
period. This is not surprising, given their stage of technological 
evolution in the market. This sector has been supplying formal- 
dehyde for a half century, is relatively mature and is therefore 
unlikely to respond with significant product innovation without 
outside assistance. 14° A subst i tute product is likely to be 
developed now that the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) is working with industry 141 to provide the necessary tech- 
nical ingredients for innovation. 
Unless existing suppliers are able to respond with a new 
product, new entrants would have every incentive to enter the 
marketplace. However, unless the need for a new product was 
fairly certain, extensive innovation might be considered too large 
Orleans, LA (March 7, 1988); See also Comments ofthe American Apparel Manufacturers A - 
sociation on OSHA's Advanced Notice ofPropesed Rulema~ ng--Occupational Exposure to For- 
maldehyde, at 5, August 13, 1985 (in response to 50 Fed. Reg. 151,799 (April 17, 1985)) 
[hereinal~er AAMA]. In what has been called a ~marriage b tween the chemical industry and 
the textile industry ~, with assistance from the USDA, a resin imparting 200-250 micrograms 
of free formaldehyde p r gram of cloth is now routinely available to the apparel industry. L. 
Elliott & B. Andrews, supra. The low formaldehyde content resins were apparently "easy to 
develop. ~(Andrews upra). For a technical description ofthe modified resins and their formal- 
dehyde release on textiles, see Kottes, Andrews & Reinhardt, Formaldehyde Release From 
Cellulose Textiles Treated for Smooth-Drying Properties with Formaldehyde and Its Amide 
Deriwtives, in WOOD AND CELLULOSICS: INDUSTRIAL UTILIZATION, BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
STRUCTURE AND PROPERTIES at 417 (Kennedy, Phillips & W~lliams ed. 1987). 
136. See NCC Comments, upra note 134. 
137. These agents have included sulfones, epoxides, and glyoxal and uther amides, but 
have focused on dihydroxyethyleneurea and N,N'-dimethyldihydroxy-ethyleneurea. SeeNCC 
Comments, upra note 134, at 5 and NCC zupra note 124, at 5-6. 
138. Id. at 5 and ATMI, supra note 123, at3. 
139. ATMI, supra note 123, at 22. 
140. As a result of a joint research effort between the industry and the United States 
Department ofAgriculture, a new product is in development. (Andrews upra note 135). 
141. Note that both the lower formaldehyde-containing resin and the new product in 
development i volved the technical assistance ofthe USDA. The industry is unlikely to have 
been able to develo p new technology by itself. Note also that the formaldehyde in the lower 
formaldehyde-c6ntaining resins is not low enough to provide asafe workplace without he use 
ofgeneral ventilation as well. The reduction of allowable formaldehyde that EPA would adopt 
would require further dramatic modifications of the existing resins. See infra note 145 and ac- 
companying text. 
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a commercial risk. 142 If new entrants could successfully develop a
substitute product hat did not present an unreasonable risk to 
human health and the environment, their commercial risk would 
be small. In that event, the entire cotton textile and apparel in- 
dustries would be waiting in the wings, m 
2. Reduction of allowable concentration 
EPA could elect to require reductions in the concentration of
formaldeh) de in resins used to treat textiles. Existing suppliers 
have already developed lower formaldehyde-containing resins for 
use in the textile industry.~44 EPA regulation could stimulate fur- 
ther innovation by the existing suppliers who could retain their 
place in the market by developing resins with even lower 1 vels 
of formaldehyde.145 It is unlikely that this scenario would at~ o.t 
new entrants to the market, as the existing suppliers would ha, 
a competitive advantage in terms of existing manufacturing plant 
and human resource xperience. 
Both options available under EPA regulation would result in 
technological innovation, with the ban creating much more radi- 
cal innovation than the reduction. A total ban would also 
eliminate all formaldehyde exposure and its associated morbidity 
and mortality. 
B. Regulation Under OSHA 
After reviewing the results of the CIIT animal bioassay in 
1979, OSHA joined the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde. The 
agency also joined the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) in the preparation of a Current Intelligence 
Bulletin on Formaldehyde which listed formaldehyde as a poten- 
tial occupational carcinogen. ~46 In 1981, a new Secretary of Labor 
withdrew the agency's ponsorship of this publication and later 
skated that he found the CIIT data unpersuasive. ~47 That same 
142. If the existing suppliers are able to develop a new product with government techni- 
cal assistance, new entrants would not likely undertake the commercial risk. 
143. According to the ATMI, tan immense and captive market awaits the developer of a 
substitute treatment for permanent-press.'Supra note 123, at 20. 
144. See NCC Comments of August 15, 1985, supra note 134, at 4-5; see also supra notes 
135, 141. 
145. EPA has limited authority under the TSCA to regulate the workplace directly. It can 
affect workplace health by limiting the nature and amount of industrial products used. There- 
fore, it could regulate the amount of formaldehyde in resins whose missions would result in 
very low ambient concentrations of formaldehyde in the absence of ventilation. Thus an EPA 
limitation on formaldehyde content could be much lower than the current industry practice 
of 200-250 micrograms per gram of cloth. See supra note 141. 
146. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 133, at 299. 
147. Id. at 299, 347-58. 
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year, the UAW petitioned OSHA to issue an emergency tem- 
porary standard (ETS) and the regulatory dance began. 14s 
1. Regulation 
Unlike EPA, OSHA's regulatory options do not include a ban. 
The agency can set permissible xposure limits (PEL's) 149 and 
short-term exposure limits (STEL's). 159 Moreover, OSHA can re- 
quire exposure monitoring, medical surveillance, medical 
removal and worker training. After five years of litigation, TM 
OSHA finally published a comprehensive h alth standard for for- 
maldehyde on December 4, 1987, which became effective on 
February 22, 1988.1s2 The standard, which regulates formal- 
dehyde as a human carcinogen, lowers the PEL from 3 ppm to 1 
ppm as an eight hour time-weighted average (TWA); sets an STEL 
of 2 ppm for any !5 minute period; and sets requirements for ex- 
posure monitoring, personal protective quipment, medical sur- 
veillance, hazard communication and worker training. 1~ 
Exposure monitoring, medical surveillance and worker training 
are triggered by any exposure at or above an action level ofa TWA 
of 0.5 ppm or STEL of 2.0 ppm. TM 
By setting a performance standard, OSHA essentially regu- 
lates the manufacturing process. Unless waivers or exemptions 
are given, the standard emands compliance from all employers 
who expose workers to the regulated substance above a certain 
action level, in this case 0.5 ppm. 
148. Id. at348. 
149. A PEL is expressed as an eight hour time-weighted average of allowable xposure. 
For example, a PEL of 2 ppm could be satisfied by four hours exposure to 3 ppm and four hours 
exposure to 1 ppm. 
150. An STEL is expressed as a maximum allowable level over a short period of time, e.g., 
an exposure not to exceed 2 ppm for longer that fifteen minutes. 
151. The UAW filed suit to compel OSHA to promulgate an ETS on August 25, 1982. Ash- 
ford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 133, at 348. 
152. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,168. 
153. Id. 
154. The standard requires periodic exposure monitoring every six months a l~r  initial 
monitoring as long as the exposure is at or above the action level of 0.5 ppm in an eight hour 
TW~ or the STEL of 2 ppm. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,255-59. Medical sur- 
veillance includes the administration fan annual medical and occupational disease question- 
naire for all workers exposed at or above the action level or the STEL, and medical testing if 
the responsible physician reviewingthe questionnaires feels that further test ingis warranted. 
In addition, all persons exposed to formaldehyde (at any level) are eligible to receive non- 
routine screening if the employer suspects that they have signs or symptoms relating to their 
exposure to formaldehyde. All medical examinations and the administration f the question- 
naire must be conducted at no expense to the worker. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, 
at 46,276-82. Worker training is required at least annually for all workers exposed at or above 
the action level or STEL. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,286-87. 
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2. Responses 
Both textile and apparel manufacturers could use general or 
source ventilation 15~ to reduce xposure. Alternatively, they could 
attempt to automate or enclose.the processes that result in the 
exposure. This response would involve process innovation. 
Theoretically, the industries could rely on employee use of per- 
sonal respiratory protective quipment to reduce exposure, but 
the standard specifies that this option is allowable only when en- 
gineering controls and work practices cannot achieve the PEL. 
Both the textile and apparel industries are convinced that the 
American public wants clothing with permanent-press charac- 
teristics. They have also stated that there are no acceptable sub- 
stitutes for formaldehyde at the moment.156 The apparel industry 
apparently successfully pressured the formaldehyde manufac- 
turers to come up with a lower formaldehyde-containing 
product. ~57 However, the modified resin must be used in combina- 
tion with general ventilation i  order to achieve compliance with 
the OSHA PEL of 1.0 ppm and to ensure that few workers in both 
the textile and apparel industries are exposed above the action 
level of 0.5 ppm. 158 
The installation of source ventilation in the apparel industry 
would be a significant innovation, but it is not now necessary, 
given the use of lower formaldehyde-containing resins. 
C. Choice of Technological Options for Anaiysis 
Table 2 ranks the technological responses expected under each 
of the regulatory options analyzed in this paper. As suggested, 
without outside assistance toexisting resin suppliers, an EPA ban 
would likely result in the development of a substitute product by 
new entrants (chemical suppliers) into the market. Existing for- 
maldehyde r sin suppliers have not yet come up with an accept- 
able non-formaldehyde substitute, but with the assistance of the 
USDA they are developing a new product.1~9 New or existing tex- 
tile manufacturers will not quickly develop a new textile or tex- 
tile-blend to replace a demonstrated consumer preference for 
cotton and cotton-blend fabric. 
If, on the other hand, EPA lowered the permissible formal- 
155. The installation of source ventilation in the apparel industry would be a significant 
innovation, but it is not likely to occur. In mest apparel plants, the sources of formaldehyde 
release are diffuse, as treated fabric is stacked around many machine operators. General on- 
the-shelf ventilation technology is the engineering control of choice. 
156. But cf. supra notes 140 and 141. 
157. See supra notes 135 and 141. 
158. See infra notes 170-186 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 140 and 141. 
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Table 2. 
Likely Technological Responses to Different Types of 
Formaldehyde Regulation 
EPA-IMPOSED BAN 
New resin by new market entrant 
Development ofacceptable non-formaldehyde resins by ex- 
isting suppliers 
New textile or textile blend 
EPA-IMPOSED REDUCTION IN HCHO CONTENT IN 
RESIN 
Existing suppliers provide altered resin-incremental in- 
novation 
New market entrant provides altered resin 
Possibility that reduction is so difficult o achieve that the 
response is the same as with a ban (see above) 
OSHA-IMPOSED STANDARD 
Use of existing ventilation technology 
Improvement in low formaldehyde-containing resins by ex- 
isting suppliers 
New market entrant with altered resin 
dehyde content in resin used to treat textiles, the existing resin 
suppliers could be expected to attempt further incremental chan- 
ges in their technology to retain their market share with the tex- 
tile industry. New firms would enter the market only if the 
existing suppliers were slow to respond. If the EPA's permissible 
formaldehyde concentration in resin were so low that neither ex- 
isting suppliers nor new entrants could come up with an accept- 
able formaldehyde-containing resin, the results would be 
essentially the same as if EPA had imposed a ban. 
The technological response to the new OSHA standard has 
been the use of largely in-place ventilation technology and the 
development of modified resins. Prior to and in anticipation ofthe 
regulation, the existing resin suppliers have made improvements 
in their low concentration formaldehyde-resin uch that many of 
the exposure l vels in the textile and apparel industries fell below 
the action level of 0.5 ppm. 16° Except for the possible but unlike- 
ly development of entirely new types of textiles, three clear tech- 
nological responses emerge for further analysis of economic osts 
and health benefits: (1) the development of a new product, (2) the 
further lowering of formaldehyde content in resins used for treat- 
ing textiles or (3) the use of largely in-place ventilation technol- 
ogy in combination with existing modified resins. 
160. See supra note 135; infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
This section explains the types of direct economic osts and 
benefits to be expected by industry under the three technological 
compliance scenarios considered above. Precise cost and health 
benefit data have not been calculated by the authors, but are given 
when available from the literature. 
A. A New Product 
1. Economic Consequences 
The existing chemical suppliers would bear the major 
economic ost of developing a non-formaldehyde resin for treat- 
ment of textiles. Approximately two percent of the 5.7 billion 
pounds of formaldehyde produced in the United States are used 
in the textile industry. 181 At approximately eight cents per pound 
(1980 price), 162 the existing suppliers could lose their $9 million 
annual market unless they develop a successful new product. 16~ 
The additional manufacturing cost of this new product, including 
development costs, is unknown. The developer of the new product 
would pass most of the cost on to the textile industry. 164 This 
would increase the latter's manufacturing cost to some extent, al- 
though resin is a minor cost item and is only one of several produc- 
tion factors. This additional cost might be offset by the louver costs 
of compliance with OSHA regulations for formaldehyde exposure 
(i.e., ventilation and medical surveillance would no lop.ger be re- 
quired) and by the benefits of any improvement in textile quality 
that might result. 
The apparel industry would bear little of the adverse conomic 
consequences of a ban which resulted in a new product. It is un- 
likely that the textile industry would pass much of its additional 
costs on to the beleaguered apparel manufacturers. But it is like- 
ly that any benefits of improved textile quality would also accrue 
to the apparel industry. 
In the unlikely event hat new entrants were unable to make 
available a substitute product within a reasonable time and if the 
EPA ban affected only resin and not cloth, the apparel industry 
would be forced to shift to foreign textile suppliers. In order to 
save their market, the textile industry might increase off-shore 
161. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,172. 
162. Ashford, Hattis, Mitchell, McCleary-Jones, Gorelick, Control of Occupational Ex- 
posures to Formaldehyde: A Case Study o]'Methodology for Assessing Health & Economic Im- 
pacts of OSI']A Health Standards, CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES 81-117 (1981). 
163. Seesupra note 141. 
164. If the existingjoin t research effort between the chemical industry and the textile in- 
dustry, assisted by the USDA, succeeds, the cost is shared. See supra note 141. 
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production, purchasing formaldehyde-containing resins from 
foreign suppliers. In the more likely event hat the ban extended 
to cloth, the apparel industry could lose a significant part of its 
market o foreign producers of finished products. 
How would any of these economic onsequences affect labor? 
Some employees of the existing formaldehyde r sin manufac- 
turers would lose their jobs. Other individuals would gain employ- 
ment in the new entrant firms or in association with new product 
lines. ~65 Workers in the textile and apparel industries hould not 
encounter significant adverse conomic onsequences in terms of 
wage reduction or job loss, unless the industries elected to move 
to off-shore production. 
A ban on formaldehyde would also result in economic benefits 
associated with reduced formaldehyde-related morbidity and 
mortality. These benefits are discussed below. 
2. Health Consequences 
A formaldehyde ban would virtually eliminate all health ef- 
fects associated with formaldehyde exposure. It is likely, however, 
that formaldehyde-related cancers would continue to occur for a 
number of years after the ban, due to long latency periods. It is 
estimated that workplace formaldehyde exposure at levels of 3 
ppm result in an excess cancer isk that ranges from 43.4 to 620 
per 100,000 based on the most likely estimate, with upper con- 
fidence levels ranging from 600 to 1,819 cases per 100,000.166 
Exact risk estimates of sensory irritation have not been calcu- 
lated, although one estimate has been made that 31% to 94% of 
workers will experience discomfort even when exposure l vels are 
as low as 0.5 to 1.0 ppm. 167 Although recognized as a serious 
problem, no reliable estimates of skin diseases associated with 
formaldehyde exposure are available. Nor has the risk of as- 
sociated respiratory disorders been quantified. Thus, the overall 
health benefits of a formaldehyde ban, although substantial, are 
difficult o determine. 
The major health benefits would accrue to workers in the ap- 
parel industry. Almost every one of its 960,000 production 
employees are exposed to formaldehyde ona daily basis. Although 
exposure levels are relatively low in this industry, the workers 
will suffer significantly fewer adverse health outcomes than are 
currently caused by their work with formaldehyde-impregnated 
textiles. For all industries involved, improvements in worker 
health status would result in savings related to reductions in 
165. The number of newly created jobs is likely to be l~ss than the number lost due to 
automation or less labor-intensive production processes in the new firms. 
166. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,223. 
167. Id. at 46,224. 
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health care costs, workers' compensation costs, employee ab- 
sence, and turnover rates. The latter savings would result in 
productivity increases with an associated increase in revenues. 
Chemical suppliers would also see reduced tort liability. 
Of course, while unlikely, it is possible that the new substitute 
product would itself prove to be hazardous. This would pose 
health risks to workers in the new firms, as well as to workers in 
the textile and apparel industries. New economic and human 
costs would ensue. It is not possible to predict hese costs for the 
purposes of the present analysis. 
B. Additional Reduction of Formaldehyde Concentration i
Resins 
1. Economic Consequences 
While it is possible that new suppliers would enter the market, 
resulting in consequences similar to those discussed above, it is 
more likely that the existing chemical suppliers would be willing 
to incur the costs of further reducing the formaldehyde in their 
product to meet an EPA regulation. This R&D cost could be 
passed on to the textile industry. It is also possible that the in- 
novation ultimately could be cost-saving, as  in the case of vinyl 
chloride regulation, and could increase the profit margin of the 
industry. Similarly, the improved resin could be useful in other 
applications, providing additional economic advg.ntage to the in- 
dustry. 
The textile industry would probably bear the economic burden 
of this regulatory option, although the magnitude of this burden 
is unknown. With little possibility for new suppliers to enter the 
market and offer lower formaldehyde-containing resin competi- 
tively, the textile industry would be obliged to purchase the im- 
proved resin from the existing suppliers and to absorb the 
expected price increase. 16~ The textile industry would be hesitant 
to pass this cost on to the apparel industry, for fear of losing its 
own market to foreign textile suppliers. This regulatory option, 
limiting the use of formaldehyde, could result in some restructur- 
ing of the textile industry over time as marginal firms might be 
unable to compete. The economic osts to the apparel industry 
would be minimal. 
168. It was apparently easy to develop alower formaldehyde-containing resin in anticipa- 
tion ofthe OSHA regulation. See supra note 135. Whether afurther, dramatic reduction would 
follow as readily is unknown. Radically different technical modi/]eation f the resin (i.e., major 
rather than minor innovation) might be necessary toreduce the amount of free formaldehyde 
below that in the present eommerdal product which yields 200-250 micrograms of formal- 
dehyde per gram of cloth. Continuing assistance by the USDA would go a long way in keep- 
ing commercial development eosts, and henee price increases, at a minimum. 
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Any economic disadvantage to labor would likely be limited to 
workers in the textile industry. The increased cost of a necessary 
production factor could result in some downward pressure on 
wages and some local unemployment as marginal firms leave the 
market. 
2. Health Consequences 
Because formaldehyde would not be eliminated under this 
regulatory option, some adverse health effects associated with for- 
maldehyde would continue to occur. Only if the regulation 
resulted in ambient exposures lower than 0.1 ppm would a large 
proportion of irritant and respiratory effects disappear. 169 A can- 
cer risk would remain, although itwould likely be reduced in mag- 
nitude. 
C. Use of Existing Ventilation Technology In Combination with 
Existing Modified Resins 
1. Economic Consequences 
The distribution of the economic burdens of complying with the 
new OSHA formaldehyde standard is significantly different from 
the distribution that would occur under the two options described 
above. To comply with the new PEL, the affected industries will 
use existing ventilation in combination with existing modified 
resins. 
There is considerable disagreement about the extent of this 
compliance cost in the apparel industry. While OSHA and the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) es- 
timate that the cost of engineering controls in this industry will 
be essentially zero because the firms are already at or below the 
PEL, Iv° the American Apparel Manufacturers Association 
169. See OSHAFinal Rule, supra note 104, at 46,173. Even at airborne concentrations as 
low as 0.1 ppm, however, formaldehyde can irritate the eyes, nose and throat. As concentra- 
tions increase, the severity of the irritation increases. 
170. In its Final Rule, OSHAestimates that the textile finishingindustry and the apparel 
industry will incur no costs relating to engineering controls in order to achieve the standard's 
PEL and STEL. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,240. In its comments on occupa- 
tional exposure to formaldehyde, the ACTWU asserted that "with currently available technol- 
ogy, apparel manufacturers are now able to comply with a new permissible exposure limit of 
either 1.0 ppm or 0.5 ppm without any capital costs whatsoever. ~ Comments of the ACTWU, 
AFL-CIO before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration the Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for a Standard to Regulate Formaldehyde at3 (1985). See 
also infra note 177. 
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(AAMA) claims otherwise. '7~ In an interesting turn of events, the 
AAMA implies higher exposure levels in the plants than es- 
timated by either OSHA or the union. 172 In contrast, OSHA con- 
cludes than no workers in the apparel industry are exposed to 
levels greater than 1.0 ppm and that most are exposed to levels 
below 0.5 ppm. lv3 
For the textile industry, OSHA estimates zero compliance 
costs for engineering controls. (The firms are already in com- 
pliance with the PEL.) Interestingly, in their comments on EPA's 
regulatory investigation of formaldehyde, the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) presents no information on their 
own sector's ability to comply with a reduced PEL, but does offer 
opinions on the apparel industry's inability to install ventilation 
technology. "Ventilation of the workplace.. ,  has immense costs 
in the case of the apparel industry . . . .  Wh i le . . .  ventilation is
technologically feasible, there is serious question as to whether it
is economically viable . . . .  The data suggest that the apparel in- 
dustry would likely respond by increasing off-shore produc- 
t ion."z74 
The new OSHA regulation is a comprehensive h alth stand- 
ard that does more than set a PEL and STEL. It also requires ex- 
posure monitoring, medical surveillance and worker training 
triggered by an action level of 0.5 ppm. '~50SHA has estimated 
the annual costs for the apparel industry of complying with these 
requirements obe $6.6 million, 176 among the highest of any af- 
fected industry. However, the ACTWU insists 177 that this calcula- 
tion depends on OSHA's erroneous estimate of 117,663 as the 
number of apparel industry workers exposed to formaldehyde b - 
tween 0.5 ppm and 1.0 ppm. '78 The union argued that the num- 
ber of apparel workers exposed to formaldehyde b tween 0.5 ppm 
and 1 ppm is closer to 17,000, approximately two percent of the 
171. In its comments o OSHA, the AAMA acknowledged that the entire industry could 
comply with a 1.5 ppm standard because of technical advances in the formaldehyde-contain- 
ing finishes applied to fabric. However, using figures generated by an Arthur D. Little study, 
the AAMA estimates that a 33% reduction, from 1.5 ppm to 1.0 ppm, could require $399 mil- 
lion in capital investment, and additional operating costs of $15.6 million per year. The AAMA 
also suggests that this reduction could result in the loss of 135,000 jobs. See AAMA, supra 
note 135. 
172. Id. 
173. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,239. 
174. See ATMI Comments, upra note 123, at 24-25. 
175. Supra note 154. 
176. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,240. 
177. Private communication with Eric Frumin, Director of Occupational Safety and 
Health for the American Clothing and Textile Workers Union (March 7, 1988). See also Tes- 
timony [Docket Number H-225A (April 14, 1986. ~ pp. 9-13]; Post-hearing Statement of the 
ACTWU, AFL-CIO on the Proposed OSHA Standard for Formaldehyde {August 15, 1986}. 
178. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,239. 
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total number of exposed workers in the textile industryY 9An in- 
dustrial hygienist from NIOSH agreed with the union's position 
that the 117,663 figure was a gross overestimate. ~s°Calculations 
based on the lower estimate of workers exposed above the action 
level would reduce the OSHA compliance cost estimate to ap- 
proximately $700,000 per year, which the apparel industry could 
absorb. 
The textile industry will find compliance with all aspects of the 
standard easier to achieve. The industry will lose its market only 
in the unlikely event hat the foreign apparel industry penetrates 
the United States market significantly or that the relocation of 
segments of the apparel industry significantly affects the market 
for American textiles. In these situations, the textile industry can 
also anticipate conomic loss. 
The formaldehyde r sin suppliers will have little difficulty 
meeting the PEL through ventilation technology, which, in fact, 
is largely in place. The total cost of engineering controls for resin 
manufacturers will be a mere $401,747. TMEven with the addition- 
al costs of exposure monitoring, medical surveillance and worker 
training, total compliance costs for the resin manufacturers will 
be 0.07% of profits. Is2 
2. Health Consequences 
The new standard reduces workplace exposure to formal- 
dehyde by two-thirds. This reduction will have a positive ffect on 
worker health, although it will not eliminate formaldehyde-re- 
lated disease and symptoms. The OSHA record contains 
numerous objections to the new PEL, with frequent calls for a 
more stringent level based on health considerations, ls3 Indeed, 
many of formaldehyde's irritant effects occur with exposures well 
below the action level of 0.5 ppm. The agency heard testimony 
from NIOSH and from a number of affected unions urging a more 
stringent PEL, but concluded that"adopting a 0.5 ppm TWA PEL 
rather than a 1 ppm TWA would reduce the risk of acute health 
effects, although it would do little to further educe the risk of 
cancer . . . .  ,,ls4 OSHA estimates that the new PEL will result in 
a 6- to 471-fold reduction in cancer isk for a worker whose ex- 
posure is decreased from an average of 3 ppm to an average of 1 
ppmY 5 The agency relies on other provisions of the standard to 
reduce the more acute health hazards. 
179. See Frumin, supra note 177. 
180. See E]liott, supra note 135 and EHiott, infra note 186. 
181. See OSHA Final Rule, supra note 104, at 46,240 
182. Id. at46,241. 
183. Id. at 46,244, 46,249. 
184. Id. at 46,252. 
185. Id. at46,223 
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The standard may have some unintended health benefits as 
well. Although physical examinations and ancillary procedures 
are limited to individuals who exhibit symptoms of, or have com- 
plaints consistent with, formaldehyde-related illness, such medi- 
cal screening may detect other incipient health problems in time 
for effective intervention. The value of this spill-over effect is un- 
known. At any rate, the health benefits of the standard, while dis- 
tributed across all industries, will be greatest for workers in those 
industries with the highest pre-regulatory exposure levels (resin 
manufacture) and in industries where a large number are exposed 
routinely (apparel). The positive conomic onsequences of reduc- 
tions in morbidity and mortality associated with formaldehyde 
exposure will be felt in those industries as well. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Formaldehyde has been an important chemical for a wide 
variety of United States industries for many years. Its acute 
health effects have been well known; its chronic respiratory and 
carcinogenic effects have been recognized only relatively recent- 
ly. The government has several regulatory options when it seeks 
to control exposure to hazardous ubstances. Each will evoke dif- 
ferent technological responses from the affected industries. The 
resulting level of health protection depends in large measure on 
the nature of the response. This Article examined three 
regulatory options for controlling exposure to formaldehyde-two 
possible options under EPA's TSCA authority and the one which 
actually occurred under OSHA. Each would result in some level 
of protection, but the distribution of the costs and benefits of each 
regulatory option would differ significantly. 
A ban on the product would encourage product innovation and 
permit he market o operate in an efficient manner by internaliz- 
ing all of the social costs of production. The small number of resin 
suppliers would suffer economic loss if new suppliers entered the 
market; the textile and apparel industries would not be severely 
affected and could even enjoy some economic benefit. In addition, 
the workers in these industries would be fully protected from the 
hazardous product. Alternatively, EPA action that reduced the 
allowable concentration of formaldehyde in resin would en- 
courage product or process innovation in the chemical industry, 
which might or might not lead to an abandonment of formal- 
dehyde-based resins. S.'lch action would place the economic bur- 
den on the textile industry and, as compared to a ban, provide 
fewer health benefits to the workers in all related industries. 
The OSHA standard will do little, if anything, to encourage 
significant innovation, although significant resin modification 
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has already occurred. Currently, almost all of the workers in the 
apparel industry are exposed below the action level of 0.5 ppm. ls~ 
Workers in the apparel and textile industries will enjoy some ad- 
ditional health benefits from the standard, but will not be fully 
protected from adverse health effects of formaldehyde exposure. 
For the apparel industry, at least, OSHA did not set the lowest 
feasible level. Is7 The most stringent regulatory option-an EPA 
ban-could result in lower economic osts, a more efficient market 
and greater health benefits. Admittedly, this is not what some 
critics of regulation would predict. Innovation, rather than dif- 
fusion of technology, is the crucial factor in arriving at a new and 
dynamic market efficiency. 
186. See supra notes 177.180 and accompanying text. See also Elliott, Stayner, Blade, 
Halperin & Keenlyside, Characterization ia Garment Manufacturing Plants: A Composite 
Summary of Three In.Depth Industrial Hygiene Surveys {Jan. 1987~ (unpublished 
manuscript, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health). 
187. See supra note 38. 
